Approved For Release 2008/07/25 : CIA-RDP85B00652R000100060013-5

SECRET

DDI Registry

DDI
28 June 1983

NOTE TO: [redacted] 25X1
Director, ALA

[redacted] 25X1
OGI/IIC/PI

FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence

The representatives will meet again on the Nicaraguan estimate. I urged the inclusion of five points to highlight the weaknesses of the insurgency:

-- The lack of attention so far by the CONTRAS to building a political infra-structure and our focus on the middle class as a base of support vice the urban poor and youth (where the real strength of the Sandinistas seems to rest).

-- Uncertainty about Pastora and his role in the insurgency.

-- The objectives of the Misura and the risk that this tribal insurgency would come to an end should their limited, local objectives be achieved.

-- That the staying power of all insurgencies is a key to their success and that the proposition that CONTRA motivation will erode in a few months without success contrasts unfavorably with the long period of time other insurgencies have been underway in Central America.

-- Nicaragua's long history of virulent anti-Americanism going back to the last century and the danger to CONTRA popular support posed by close identification with the US.

-- There was agreement to eliminate the policy implications section and work those points into the key judgments.

[redacted] 25X1

Robert M. Gates

SECRET [redacted] 25X1

Approved For Release 2008/07/25 : CIA-RDP85B00652R000100060013-5